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  Some	  years	  ago,	  Colin	  McGinn	  decided	  to	  ‘turn	  [his]	  attention	  to	  fundamental	  metaphysics’.	  Though	  he	  hadn’t	  ‘seriously	  worked	  on	  philosophy	  of	  physics	  before’	  and	  had	  to	  ‘learn	  it	  from	  scratch’,	  he	  wanted	  ‘to	  think	  about	  the	  most	  basic	  categories	  of	  reality’	  through	  ‘philosophical	  reflections	  on	  basic	  physics’	  (p.	  3).	  The	  volume	  here	  reviewed	  represents	  the	  fruits	  of	  these	  labours.	  His	  stated	  purpose	  is	  to	  communicate	  his	  insights	  on	  fundamental	  physics	  whilst	  taking	  seriously	  ‘the	  injunction	  to	  be	  clear	  to	  my	  colleagues	  who	  may	  not’—unlike	  Prof.	  McGinn	  himself—‘know	  much	  about	  the	  details	  of	  physical	  theories’;	  hence	  nothing	  in	  his	  book	  ‘should	  be	  baffling	  to	  readers	  innocent	  of	  the	  technicalities—no	  equations,	  no	  unexplained	  jargon,	  no	  mystification’	  (p.	  4).	  His	  basic	  thesis	  is	  that	  ‘a	  deep	  ignorance	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  physics,	  despite	  its	  formal	  richness’	  (p.	  5)	  so	  that	  ‘the	  entire	  world	  is	  shot	  through	  with	  mystery’	  (p.	  7).	  In	  consequence,	  our	  best	  theories	  of	  physics	  come—by	  some	  extraordinary	  coincidence—to	  mirror	  perfectly	  McGinn’s	  famed	  theory	  of	  the	  mind.	  	  	  Part	  of	  the	  reason	  McGinn	  judges	  physicists	  deeply	  ignorant	  of	  their	  subject	  matter	  is	  that	  they	  don’t	  engage	  with	  the	  hard	  metaphysical	  questions	  he	  is	  able	  to	  form	  in	  his	  head,	  such	  as	  the	  question	  of	  ‘in	  virtue	  of	  what’	  matter	  is	  ‘absolutely	  and	  constantly	  impenetrable’	  (p.	  33).	  McGinn	  offers	  an	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  with	  his	  ‘Deletion	  Theory’,	  according	  to	  which	  matter	  annihilates	  space	  whenever	  it	  occupies	  it—thus	  creating	  ‘holes	  in	  space’	  of	  varying	  depth,	  the	  depth	  proportional	  to	  the	  mass	  of	  the	  object.	  (Naturally,	  we’ll	  have	  to	  postulate	  an	  ‘extra	  dimension	  to	  space	  to	  accommodate	  the	  effects	  of	  mass	  at	  the	  particle	  level’,	  but	  given	  that	  we	  have	  got	  ‘(somewhat!)	  used	  to	  entertaining	  the	  idea	  of	  extra	  dimensions	  to	  space	  in	  String	  Theory’	  we	  needn’t	  be	  resistant	  to	  this	  consequence	  (p.	  41).)	  Only	  in	  a	  shoehorned-­‐in	  ‘Postscript’	  does	  McGinn	  moot	  that	  what	  might	  explain	  physicists’	  indifference	  to	  the	  stated	  question	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  matter	  is	  not	  impenetrable—something	  that	  has	  in	  fact	  been	  known	  since	  at	  least	  the	  advent	  of	  quantum	  mechanics.	  While	  one	  would	  be	  excused	  for	  taking	  this	  to	  render	  the	  previous	  chapter	  obsolete,	  it	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  easily	  dealt	  with:	  for	   why	  not	  say	  that	  fields,	  though	  they	  do	  not	  delete	  space,	  can	  nevertheless	  
dilute	  it?	  Call	  this	  the	  ‘Dilution	  Theory’.	  According	  to	  this	  theory,	  when	  a	  field	  comes	  to	  pervade	  a	  region	  of	  space	  it	  thins	  the	  space	  out,	  so	  that	  it	  is	  less	  “dense”	  than	  before...	  [Thus]	  while	  solid	  matter	  deletes	  space…	  electrical	  fields	  act	  to	  dilute	  space,	  and	  hence	  make	  it	  harder	  to	  occupy	  (by	  like	  charged	  particles)	  (p.	  46).	  	  Bracketing	  for	  now	  McGinn’s	  misinformed	  belief	  that	  quantum	  wavefunctions	  are	  ‘nothing	  but	  graded	  force’	  and	  identical	  with	  electrical	  fields	  (p.	  46),	  we	  can	  ask	  some	  fascinating	  questions.	  How,	  according	  to	  the	  Dilution	  Theory,	  can	  we	  superpose	  an	  unlimited	  number	  of	  wavefunctions	  at	  a	  single	  point?	  And	  what	  
happens	  when	  we	  have	  particles	  that	  are	  un-­‐	  or	  unlike-­‐charged?	  We	  eagerly	  await	  his	  answers.	  	  	  But	  don’t	  think	  that	  physicists	  are	  deeply	  ignorant	  only	  as	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  matter.	  A	  deep	  confusion	  similarly	  wracks	  the	  physicist’s	  concept	  of	  motion.	  Like	  a	  Daily	  Mail	  ‘People’s	  Champion’	  column	  taking	  aim	  at	  Einsteinian	  physics,	  Chapter	  3	  tries	  to	  salvage	  our	  ‘normal	  conception’	  that	  motion	  is	  absolute	  with	  a	  proof	  of	  the	  logical	  impossibility	  of	  empty	  space	  if	  motion	  is	  merely	  relative	  (pp.	  78-­‐80).	  (I’d	  mention	  that	  the	  spacetime	  explicitly	  assumed	  here	  is	  one	  in	  which	  there	  are	  facts	  about	  the	  identity	  of	  points	  of	  space	  over	  time—precisely	  that	  which	  was	  jettisoned	  in	  Neo-­‐Newtonian	  spacetime	  in	  order	  to	  extradict	  absolute	  motion.	  But	  why	  bother	  with	  technicalities?)	  	  McGinn	  admits	  that	  the	  experimentally	  verified	  fact	  that	  the	  speed	  of	  light	  is	  the	  same	  in	  all	  frames	  would	  apparently	  contradict	  his	  theory,	  but	  assuages	  this	  worry	  by	  	   suppos[ing]	  that	  the	  absolute	  speed	  of	  light	  is	  constant,	  which	  means	  that	  observers	  can	  reduce	  the	  difference	  of	  speed	  between	  themselves	  and	  light,	  hence	  varying	  relative	  speed—but	  that	  relative	  speed	  is	  always	  
measured	  as	  constant.	  It	  is	  thus	  not	  really	  constant,	  but	  only	  apparently	  constant.	  …	  The	  apparent	  constancy	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  interaction	  effect—an	  effect	  of	  the	  measurement	  relation	  between	  light	  and	  the	  observer	  (p.	  90).	  	  My	  only	  query	  to	  McGinn	  on	  this	  point	  is	  why	  he	  settled	  for	  a	  mere	  philosophy	  book	  as	  the	  forum	  in	  which	  to	  publish	  it.	  After	  all,	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  preserve	  his	  pretheoretic	  views	  about	  motion	  he’s	  discovered	  an	  as-­‐yet	  unknown	  type	  of	  interaction:	  should	  not	  Physical	  Review	  be	  alerted?	  	  Part	  of	  the	  motivation	  McGinn	  offers	  for	  believing	  that	  physicists	  do	  not	  understand	  motion—as	  opposed	  to	  providing	  ‘plausible	  sounding	  would-­‐be	  explanations	  that	  don’t	  stand	  up	  to	  scrutiny’—is	  that	  by	  making	  motion	  as	  conceptually	  opaque	  as	  matter	  ‘we	  achieve	  a	  theoretical	  unity	  in	  the	  basic	  terms	  of	  the	  science’	  (p.	  88).	  Unity	  of	  science	  is	  thus	  achieved	  by	  our	  not	  having	  the	  foggiest	  idea	  about	  anything	  in	  it—with	  the	  rapturously	  Hegelian	  consequence	  that	  our	  knowledge	  is	  proportional	  to	  our	  ignorance.	  But	  the	  above	  questions	  of	  why	  matter	  is	  impenetrable	  and	  how	  motion	  can	  be	  absolute	  despite	  being	  merely	  relative	  by	  no	  means	  exhaust	  the	  questions	  McGinn	  is	  amazed	  to	  find	  physicists	  not	  giving	  a	  stuff	  about.	  Here	  is	  another:	  	   I	  am	  struck	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  treatises	  on	  particle	  physics	  never	  say	  what	  
shape	  the	  particles	  have,	  and	  whether	  different	  kinds	  of	  particles	  might	  have	  different	  shapes.	  In	  diagrams	  they	  are	  usually	  depicted	  as	  spherical,	  but	  such	  a	  determination	  never	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  the	  theories	  of	  particles—unlike	  questions	  of	  charge	  and	  mass.	  Would	  it	  matter	  if	  an	  electron	  had	  a	  star	  shape?	  (p.	  93)	  	  Call	  this	  missing	  theory	  of	  particle	  shape	  the	  ‘Lucky	  Charms’	  theory	  of	  matter.	  Sadly,	  space	  constraints	  prohibit	  me	  from	  discussing	  this	  theory	  further.	  	  
McGinn’s	  thesis,	  to	  repeat,	  is	  that	  our	  technical	  competence	  with	  physics	  ‘conceals	  vast	  chasms	  of	  ignorance’	  (p.	  141).	  This	  is,	  in	  many	  ways,	  an	  appropriate	  conclusion	  for	  someone	  with	  no	  grasp	  of	  the	  rudiments	  of	  the	  subject.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  there	  are	  desperately	  challenging	  questions	  posed	  by	  fundamental	  physics	  that	  continue	  to	  defeat	  metaphysicians.	  But	  as	  with	  the	  claims	  of	  a	  crystal-­‐wielding	  cryptic,	  McGinn's	  arguments	  rely	  on	  the	  mere	  fact	  that	  such	  challenges	  exist	  to	  give	  their	  conclusions	  the	  veneer	  of	  the	  profound.	  As	  was	  said	  of	  the	  Sokal	  hoax,	  there	  is	  simply	  no	  way	  to	  do	  justice	  to	  the	  cringe-­‐inducing	  nature	  of	  this	  text	  without	  quoting	  it	  in	  its	  entirety.	  But	  in	  a	  nutshell,	  
Basic	  Structures	  of	  Reality	  is	  an	  impressively	  inept	  contribution	  to	  philosophy	  of	  physics,	  and	  one	  exemplifying	  everything	  that	  can	  possibly	  go	  wrong	  with	  metaphysics:	  it	  is	  mind-­‐numbingly	  repetitive,	  toe-­‐curlingly	  pretentious,	  and	  amateurish	  in	  the	  extreme	  regarding	  the	  incorporation	  of	  physical	  fact.	  With	  work	  this	  grim,	  the	  only	  interesting	  questions	  one	  can	  raise	  concern	  not	  the	  content	  directly	  but	  the	  conditions	  that	  made	  it	  possible;	  and	  in	  this	  connection,	  one	  might	  be	  tempted	  to	  present	  the	  book	  as	  further	  evidence	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  engagement	  of	  metaphysicians	  with	  real	  science—something	  that	  has	  lately	  been	  subject	  to	  lively	  discussion	  (and	  I	  myself	  have	  slung	  some	  of	  the	  mud).	  But	  I’d	  insist	  that	  to	  use	  this	  work	  to	  make	  a	  general	  point	  about	  the	  discipline	  would	  in	  fact	  be	  entirely	  unfair.	  For	  one	  thing,	  while	  contemporary	  metaphysicians	  are	  often	  tokenistic	  in	  their	  treatments,	  I	  think	  most	  would	  appreciate	  that	  looking	  at	  
the	  pictures	  in	  a	  book	  is	  of	  limited	  value	  qua	  research	  into	  unobservable	  entities,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  the	  auspicious	  ‘1700-­‐page	  textbook	  University	  Physics’	  (p.	  129)	  that	  informs	  McGinn’s	  critique.	  Furthermore,	  McGinn	  has	  scant	  interest	  in	  getting	  to	  grips	  not	  only	  with	  the	  relevant	  science,	  but	  also	  the	  work	  of	  fellow	  philosophers	  wrestling	  with	  questions	  similar	  to	  those	  he	  feigns	  to	  be	  concerned	  with	  here.	  Despite	  defending	  dispositional	  essentialism,	  for	  example,	  there	  is	  no	  mention	  of	  Mumford,	  Ellis	  or	  Bird;	  he	  cites	  nothing	  by	  Maudlin,	  or	  Albert,	  or	  virtually	  any	  philosopher	  that	  naturalistically	  inclined	  metaphysicians	  have	  grown	  to	  rely	  upon	  for	  philosophy	  of	  physics	  input,	  with	  the	  result	  that	  his	  philosophical	  argumentation	  is	  strewn	  with	  undergraduate-­‐level	  errors.	  Similarly,	  while	  given	  the	  title	  one	  would	  expect	  some	  meaningful	  engagement	  with	  the	  field	  of	  structural	  realism	  (something,	  I	  add,	  that	  he	  fundamentally	  misrepresents,	  as	  aficionados	  can	  confirm	  on	  page	  10),	  instead	  we	  find	  a	  single	  reference	  to	  a	  contemporary	  work	  in	  that	  area—namely,	  ‘Mark	  Lange’s	  article	  ‘‘Structural	  Realism’’	  in	  the	  online	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia’	  (p.	  5).	  Since	  Marc	  (that’s	  ‘Marc’)	  Lange	  is	  not	  a	  structural	  realist,	  and	  it	  was	  in	  fact	  James	  Ladyman	  who	  wrote	  said	  Stanford	  article,	  one	  can	  only	  assume	  it	  is	  the	  latter’s	  piece	  that	  McGinn	  has	  in	  mind	  here.	  (One	  also	  can’t	  help	  but	  assume,	  of	  course,	  that	  he	  never	  actually	  bothered	  to	  read	  it.)	  	  	  For	  all	  the	  epistemic	  faux-­‐modesty	  that	  this	  book	  purports	  to	  defend,	  the	  image	  that	  persists	  while	  grinding	  through	  its	  pages	  is	  of	  an	  individual	  ludicrously	  fancying	  themselves	  as	  uniquely	  positioned	  to	  solve	  the	  big	  questions	  for	  us,	  from	  scratch	  and	  unassisted,	  as	  if	  none	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  us	  working	  in	  the	  field	  have	  had	  anything	  worth	  a	  damn	  to	  contribute.	  It	  will	  however	  be	  clear	  by	  now	  that	  I	  regard	  the	  reality	  to	  be	  substantially	  different.	  For	  me,	  then,	  the	  one	  pertinent	  question	  this	  work	  raises	  is	  why	  all	  of	  this	  went	  unrecognized:	  this	  book,	  after	  
all,	  issues	  not	  from	  one	  of	  the	  many	  spurious	  publishing	  houses	  currently	  trolling	  graduate	  students,	  but	  Oxford	  University	  Press—a	  press	  whose	  stated	  aim	  is	  to	  ‘publish	  works	  that	  further	  Oxford	  University’s	  objective	  of	  excellence	  in	  research,	  scholarship,	  and	  education’.	  So	  why	  did	  they	  publish	  this?	  I	  can	  hazard	  no	  explanation	  other	  than	  that	  Colin	  McGinn	  is	  a	  ‘big	  name’,	  and	  if	  that	  is	  sufficient	  for	  getting	  work	  this	  farcical	  in	  print	  with	  OUP	  then	  shame	  on	  our	  field	  as	  a	  whole.	  As	  such,	  McGinn’s	  foray	  into	  philosophy	  of	  physics	  may	  in	  the	  end	  provoke	  a	  worthwhile	  discussion,	  if	  sadly	  one	  focused	  on	  concerns	  rather	  different	  from	  those	  he	  himself	  had	  in	  mind. 	  KERRY	  McKENZIE	  Department	  of	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  University	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  2500	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